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GLACIER BAY AND ALASKA v. UNITED STATES:
WHO OWNS SUBMERGED LANDS IN
FEDERAL RESERVES?
Jana Magnuson*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Alaska v. United States,1 the State of Alaska sued the federal
government to quiet title to submerged lands underlying the waters of
Glacier Bay National Monument (the Monument)2 and other marine areas
of the storied southeastern region of the state.3 The State invoked the
United States Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over suits between a
state and the United States,4 and was given leave to file a bill of complaint
against the United States.5 After a Special Master6 appointed by the Court
recommended summary judgment be granted for the United States, Alaska
filed exceptions and the Court set oral argument.7
The principal question presented in this case was whether title to the
submerged lands had passed to Alaska at statehood under the “equal

*. University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2007. In dedication, the Author
remembers two twentieth century men: Anastasios Kollias and Charles W. Harmon, her
grandfathers.
1. 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. 2137 (2005), judgment entered, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1014
(2006).
2. The Monument was so named until 1980, when it was expanded and re-designated
as “Glacier Bay National Park” and “Glacier Bay National Preserve.” See Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as 16
U.S.C. § 410hh-1(1) (2000)).
3. The other marine areas at issue in the case were areas of the Alexander Archipelago
and the Tongass National Forest. See infra note 68.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (2000); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 2.
5. See Alaska v. United States, 530 U.S. 1228 (2000).
6. Alaska v. United States, 531 U.S. 941 (2000) (appointing Professor Gregory E.
Maggs of Washington, D.C. as Special Master).
7. Alaska v. United States, 543 U.S. 953 (2004).
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footing” doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act (SLA),8 or whether the
United States had successfully defeated conveyance of title at that time by
a “very plain” showing of its intent to retain title for the United States.
Among the counts in the complaint, the issue of title to lands under Glacier
Bay proved particularly contentious as it posed the specific question of
submerged lands ownership within federal reservations. On this issue, the
Court overruled Alaska’s exceptions, holding that the United States held
title to the submerged lands of Glacier Bay.9
This Note first reviews the development of the law of submerged lands
ownership and the judicial approach to such questions arising within the
context of federal reserves. After examining a prior application of this
approach to other areas in Alaska, the Note discusses how the Court has set
out to resolve the tension between state and federal claims of ownership by
considering both the purposes of the federal reservations at issue and the
state’s uses or possible uses. The Note explicates the Court’s test governing
disputes over submerged lands in federal reservations and then considers
the stated and unstated burdens borne by the parties in these cases. The
provocative question illuminated by this case is: what must a party show to
successfully claim title to submerged lands within a federal reservation?
II. OWNERSHIP OF SUBMERGED LANDS
A. Equal Footing and the Submerged Lands Act
The equal footing doctrine ensures that new states join the United States
possessing the same sovereignty rights as the thirteen original states.10
Because submerged lands that lie beneath navigable waters were never
granted to the United States in the Constitution, but were instead reserved
to the thirteen original states, the doctrine holds that the federal government
holds lands under navigable waters in trust for future states, with new states
assuming title to the submerged lands within their boundaries as an
“incident of sovereignty”11 in order to gain “equal footing” with established
states.12

8. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
9. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. 2137, 2161 (2005).
10. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 281 n.9
(1982).
11. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-11 (1842).
12. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845); see also United States
v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (hereinafter Alaska (Arctic Coast)). This application of the
equal footing doctrine is sometimes referred to as “the rule of Pollard’s Lessee” or “the
Pollard rule.”
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At the end of World War II, President Truman issued what is
commonly known in the law of the sea as the Truman Proclamation,
claiming for the federal government exclusive control over the natural
resources of the continental shelf adjacent to the coasts of the United
States.13 Although this announcement is famous for its profound ramifications for international law,14 it also manifested an abrupt departure from the
domestic legal regime over coastal submerged lands by asserting that the
federal government now owned these lands.15
At the time of the Truman Proclamation, some states were engaged in
leasing offshore oil and gas exploration rights.16 In United States v.
California,17 the federal government challenged these leases as invalid in
light of the new federal claim of ownership to the submerged ocean bed.
Holding in favor of the United States, the Supreme Court differentiated
between inland navigable waters such as “rivers, harbors, and . . .
tidelands,”18 over which the original states were sovereign, and ocean
waters seaward of the coast.19 Persuaded by post-war considerations of
national sovereignty and security,20 the Court held that the United States
possessed “paramount” rights and power over submerged lands (and any
resources in those lands) underlying the state’s coastal ocean waters from
the low-tide mark extending three nautical miles to sea.21
In response to the California decision and consistent Court decisions
involving claims to submerged lands by Louisiana and Texas,22 Congress
codified the equal footing doctrine and confirmed state title to “lands

13. See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
14. Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates,
1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 10, 15 (1998) (discussing how the Truman
Proclamation marked the beginning of the multinational rush to claim jurisdictional control
over adjacent seas, leading to the United Nations consideration that eventually yielded the
U.N. Law of the Sea Convention).
15. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 346 (2d ed. 2002).
16. Id.; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23 (1947).
17. 332 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1947).
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id. at 38-39.
20. Id. at 35 (“The three-mile rule is but a recognition of the necessity that a [coastal
nation’s] government . . . must be able to protect itself from dangers incident to its
location.”). Id.
21. Id. at 38-39.
22. See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950). See also Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A
Historical Refutation of State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1056, 1058-60
(1974), for a consideration of both cases.
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beneath navigable waters” by enacting the Submerged Lands Act of 1953
(SLA).23 The SLA ceded ownership and control to the states of lands
beneath the territorial sea24 as well as inland navigable waters.25 Under the
SLA, state ownership carries the “right and power to manage, administer,
lease, develop, and use” submerged lands beneath navigable waters and the
natural resources within those lands and waters.26 This ownership right has
historically been recognized as a power to control commercial activity such
as fishing and navigation, as well as a fundamental attribute of state
sovereignty.27
Since passage of the SLA, a strong presumption exists that ownership
of submerged lands passed to a state at statehood.28 The federal government
can rebut this presumption and defeat a state’s title, however, by
demonstrating that submerged lands were set aside before statehood “in a
way that shows an intent to retain title.”29 The Court will not infer this
intent; it must be “definitely declared or otherwise made very plain.”30
In cases involving the particular question of submerged lands within
federal land reserves, such as Indian reservations, reclamation sites, and
federal wildlife preserves, the Court has developed a test of intent for
determining whether the federal government sufficiently prevented
transferring title of submerged lands to a state. This two-step test31 is met
when (1) an executive reservation before or at statehood clearly includes
submerged lands, and (2) “Congress recognizes the reservation in a way that
23. See United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 37 (1978).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000).
25. Id. § 1311(a). Although the SLA did not define inland waters, the Court subsequently adopted definitions consistent with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 165 (1965); see
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T.
1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Convention]. One recognized type
of inland waters are “juridical bays,” defined as “well-marked indentations” along the coast;
that is, the bays possess features that would allow a hypothetical mariner to perceive their
contours on a navigational chart. Convention, art. 7(2).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
27. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987) (“Because title
to [submerged] land was important to the sovereign’s ability to control navigation, fishing,
and other commercial activity on rivers and lakes [under common law], ownership of this
land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.”). Id.
28. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1997).
29. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2144; United States v. Alaska
(Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 33-34.
30. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).
31. The inquiry is described neatly in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 273 (2001).
See United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 36, 41; Utah Div. of State Lands v.
United States, 482 U.S. at 202.
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demonstrates an intent to defeat state title.”32 Under step one, the Court will
look to see whether Congress “was on notice” that the executive reservation
included the submerged lands and also whether the purpose of the
reservation “would have been compromised” or undermined if title to the
submerged lands had transferred to the state.33 Step two, as this Note will
discuss further, requires a definite declaration or some other clear and plain
showing of federal intent to defeat state title.34
B. The Alaska Statehood Act and Submerged Lands in
Alaska’s Oil Regions
Given its abundance of coastal and inland waterways and its large areas
of federally owned lands, it is not surprising that Alaska has been involved
in more disputes over submerged lands than any other state.35 The issue
was addressed at the time of Alaska’s statehood through section 6(m) of the
Alaska Statehood Act (ASA), expressly applying the SLA to Alaska upon
admission and thus codifying a presumption of state title to submerged
lands.36
More broadly, section 5 of the ASA provided that upon Alaska’s
admission, the United States would retain ownership of all property it had
held in Alaska before statehood, while the new state would acquire title to
property previously held by the Territory of Alaska.37 However, this
general rule was subject to an exception set forth in section 6(e), regarding
certain types of wildlife conservation areas, that was to prove both
important and problematic:
All real and personal property of the United States situated in the
Territory of Alaska which is specifically used for the sole purpose
of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of
Alaska [under three specific fish and game laws listed explicitly]

32. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 273.
33. Id. at 273-74.
34. See United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 35.
35. Report of the Special Master 128 at 2-3, n.2 [hereinafter Special Master’s Report].
In addition to the Note case and Alaska (Arctic Coast), litigation has involved coastal
submerged lands in Norton Sound (United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569 (1992)) and Cook
Inlet (United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975)). For discussions of disputed ownership
of Alaska’s submerged lands, see Denise Dosier, The Clouds Are Lifting: The Problem of
Title to Submerged Lands in Alaska, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 271 (1991); Duncan Hollomon, The
Struggle for Alaska’s Submerged Land, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 69 (1988).
36. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 343 (1958) [hereinafter
ASA].
37. Id. § 5.
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. . . shall be transferred and conveyed to the State of Alaska . . .
Provided, That such transfer shall not include lands withdrawn or
otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of
wildlife . . . .38
The state-federal dispute in United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast)39
largely concerned title to oil-rich submerged lands within two federal
reservations in the state’s North Slope region: the National Petroleum
Reserve and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR).40 In holding
that title to these areas had been retained by the United States, the Court
first generally emphasized the SLA’s terms that equal footing (submerged)
lands pass to a state unless “expressly retained” by the United States.41 The
Court also reaffirmed that federal “intent to defeat state title to submerged
lands must be ‘definitely declared or otherwise made very plain.’”42 The
Court then looked for such express intent with both reserves.43
Regarding the National Petroleum Reserve, the Court first found the
requisite expression of intent to include submerged lands within the federal
reservation in President Harding’s executive order creating the reserve,
which described the reservation’s boundaries in a way that necessarily
included some submerged tidelands landward of barrier islands.44
Acknowledging that the reservation of water areas does not in and of itself
indicate that submerged lands are included, the Court was persuaded by
considering the purpose for which the reservation was established: to secure
supplies of oil for the Navy from the area’s valuable subsurface petroleum
resources.45 To the Court, it was “simply not plausible” that the federal
government would not have intended to reserve submerged areas along with
upland areas, because the express purpose “would have been undermined”
if oil deposits underlying lagoons and tidal waters had been excluded from
the reservation.46 In so deciding, the Court distinguished cases put forth by
Alaska “where the disputed submerged lands were unnecessary for
achieving the federal objectives.”47 Addressing the second step, the Court
found the requisite intent to defeat state title to submerged lands of the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 6(e) (italics in original).
521 U.S. 1 (1997).
United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 6.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)).
See id. at 36-46.
Id. at 36-40.
United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 38-39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40-41.
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National Petroleum Reserve in a section of the ASA that explicitly referred
to retained federal power over lands “owned by the United States and held
for military . . . purposes, including [the National Petroleum Reserve].”48
Regarding ANWR, the second disputed reserve, the Court repeated its
two-part analysis. It first found the intent to include submerged lands in the
reservation within the boundary description,49 which necessarily included
submerged areas, and in the application’s express references to the purposes
of the proposed range.50 These purposes included the preservation of submerged areas providing nesting for migratory waterfowl, river bottoms used
by moose, and coastal habitats for polar bears, seals, and whales.51 Again,
the Court distinguished the State’s cited authority, Montana v. United
States52 and Utah Division of Lands v. United States,53 by recognizing that
“in each case, [the Court] focused on the purpose of the . . . reservation as
a critical factor in determining federal intent” and that here, retaining lands
underlying waters of habitats “was critical” to the federal government’s
preservation goal.54
Finally, the Court found explicit intent to defeat state title in the proviso
of section 6(e) of the ASA, which named lands “withdrawn or otherwise set
apart as refuges . . . for the protection of wildlife” as an exception to the
general grant of title to Alaska to lands within its territory.55 Significantly,
however, the Court did not analyze or question the relationship between the
main clause of section 6(e) and its proviso. Rather, it treated the section as
exempting all areas set aside for wildlife conservation from conveyance to
the state, rather than only a subset of property “specifically used for the sole
purpose of conservation” of fish and wildlife under three specific fish and
game statutes (none of which in fact were pertinent to ANWR).56 Although
this issue was tangentially raised by Justice Thomas in his partial dissent,57
it was not discussed in any detail to foreshadow its centrality to the Glacier
Bay dispute of the Note case.

48. Id.; see Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 11(b), 72 Stat. 347 (1958).
49. United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 51.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
53. 482 U.S. 193 (1987).
54. United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 51-52.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. 2137, 2166-67 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) (quoting § 6, 72 Stat. at 340).
57. United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 69 n.5. Justice Thomas was
joined in his partial dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
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III. THE COURT’S DECISION ON GLACIER BAY IN
ALASKA V. UNITED STATES
Glacier Bay National Park is, at over three million acres, one of the
nation’s largest national parks.58 President Coolidge created Glacier Bay
National Monument in 1925 pursuant to the Antiquities Act;59 Presidents
Franklin Roosevelt and Eisenhower subsequently expanded and altered its
boundaries.60 It is a scientifically fascinating area, valuable for the study of
glacier flow and of prehistoric forest remnants exposed by rapid glacial
retreat.61 Biologists are interested in observing the plant and animal
succession that follows in the wake of this retreat, as well as the rich variety
of wildlife in and around Glacier Bay’s waters, including seabirds, whales,
and brown bears that swim to reach sources of food on small islands.62 It
is also an area of pristine and awesome beauty. Naturalist John Muir
described the sight of huge glacial masses “calving,” crashing into the sea
to become icebergs.63 Today, tourists embark on the numerous cruise ships
that ply Glacier Bay to witness these same sights.64
In Alaska v. United States,65 “one of the largest quiet title actions ever
litigated,”66 the State of Alaska sought to quiet title67 to submerged lands
underlying Glacier Bay and other waters68 of the state’s vast and storied

58. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2153.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000). See also infra notes 87-88.
60. 53 Stat. 2534 (1939); 69 Stat. c27 (1955).
61. See Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2153-55; see also National
Park Service: Glacier Bay, http://www.nps.gov/glba/index.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
62. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2154-55.
63. Id.
64. National Park Service: Glacier Bay, http://www.nps.gov/glbaplanyourvisit/cruising
.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
65. 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. 2137 (2005).
66. Special Master’s Report, supra note 35, at 2.
67. Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (2000) (allowing the United States to be named
as a defendant in a civil action over disputed title to real property); see also California v.
Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 64 (1979) (waiving the United States’ sovereign immunity for actions
to quiet title).
68. The complaint listed three counts in addition to the Glacier Bay issue. In Counts I
and II, the State argued that the waters of the Alexander Archipelago qualified as inland
waters under two alternative theories: (1) they were “historic inland waters” and (2) the
geographic features of the waters met the criteria for a juridical bay (a feature recognized
as inland waters under article 7(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone). Special Master’s Report, supra note 35, at 4. The United States
successfully counter-argued that the requisite showings to declare these waters as inland
waters were not made. On these two counts, the Special Master recommended summary
judgment for the United States. Id. at 137, 226.
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southeastern region. In contrast to the controversy in Alaska (Arctic Coast),
mineral interests were not directly at issue here.69 Alaska was interested in
allowing more cruise boat entries into the bay,70 and in allowing continued
commercial and subsistence fishing within its waters.71 Under federal
management, commercial fishing in Glacier Bay was being phased out amid
much controversy within the state.72 Meanwhile, ongoing federal activities
involving the submerged bed of Glacier Bay included acoustic and sonar
imaging (conducted from the surface) relating to glacier study. The federal
government had also installed listening devices in the bed to gauge vessel
noise for its potential interference with whale communication.73
Invoking its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court granted leave for
the State of Alaska to file a complaint against the United States.74 The
Court then appointed a Special Master, who recommended summary
judgment for the United States on all the disputed submerged lands.75
Alaska filed a bill of exception and the United States filed for summary
judgment.76
Alaska argued that the submerged lands within the boundaries of
Glacier Bay National Monument were never expressly reserved by the

Count III of the State’s complaint, seeking to quiet title to submerged lands within
the Tongass National Forest region, was initially challenged by the United States; however,
the United States changed its position and disclaimed title. Id. at 5. The Special Master
recommended that the Court confirm the disclaimer and dismiss this count. Id. at 276-277.
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct.
2137 (No. 128).
70. Alaska Governor Frank Murkowski had been outspoken about allowing more vessels
in the Bay. See Surprise: Showing the Flag in Glacier Bay, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr.
14, 2005, at B6, available at 2005 WLNR 5850719 (describing a public relations feat in
which Governor Murkowski sent a state ferry through Glacier Bay, disregarding National
Park Service vessel limits, as a “symbolic” display of state presence in those waters).
71. See id.; see also Liz Ruskin, State Loses Lawsuit over Glacier Bay, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2005, at B1, available at 2005 WLNR 9028611.
72. See Svend Holst, Knowles Sues for Control over Bay, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Nov. 26, 1999
(quoting then-Governor Tony Knowles: “It is time to resolve, once and for all, the issue of
where federal jurisdiction ends and state jurisdiction begins [in Glacier Bay] . . . . The [U.S.]
Park Service’s phase-out of commercial fishing in Glacier Bay is just one of many actions
taken over the years that restricts access and activities on state waters.”). Id.
73. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct.
2137 (No. 128).
74. Alaska v. United States, 530 U.S. 1228 (2000).
75. The Special Master recommended that summary judgment be granted to the United
States on the Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay counts, and that the Court dismiss the
Tongass claim in light of the United States Government’s concession to the State of Alaska
on that issue. Special Master’s Report, supra note 35, at 1.
76. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2143.
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United States and so passed to Alaska at statehood under the SLA and equal
footing doctrine. Unlike lands claimed in the other counts of the State’s
complaint, here there was no question that these waters qualified as inland
waters: the area formed a “textbook” juridical bay.77 Alaska thus argued
that under the SLA, ownership to Glacier Bay’s submerged lands belonged
with the State under its “strong presumption” of title, rebuttable only by the
federal government’s showing under the two-part intent test that the United
States had intended to include the submerged lands within the reservation,
and had “definitely declared or otherwise made very plain” its intent to
defeat the State’s title.78
Alaska did not strenuously dispute that the federal government had
included submerged lands within the reservation.79 Instead, the State
focused on the second part of the intent test, arguing that the United States
did not meet its burden to rebut a strong presumption for Alaska’s
ownership by showing any sufficiently clear and unambiguous expression
of intent to retain title to the Glacier Bay submerged lands at statehood.
The United States, tracking its successful argument in Alaska (Arctic
Coast), argued that the two-step federal intent test had been met, thus
rebutting the presumption and vesting title with the federal government.
Although Alaska had conceded the first step of the test, the United States
nevertheless offered that the executive branch had clearly included
submerged lands as part of Glacier Bay National Monument by pointing to
the text of presidential proclamations establishing and expanding the
Monument.80 These proclamations contained boundary notations and
square mileage that, by their measurements and descriptions, necessarily
included submerged lands.81 Finally, the United States argued that three
purposes of the reservation would have been undermined by not reserving
the submerged lands: scientific study of the glaciers, study of the
interglacial forests, and protection of the Monument’s “rich and varied flora
and fauna.”82
Second, as in Alaska (Arctic Coast), the United States asserted that a
clear expression of intent to defeat state title in the ASA could be found in

77. Id. at 2153.
78. Id. at 2144-45.
79. Alaska did not formally argue this point; in a footnote it did assert objections to the
Special Master’s conclusion that presidential proclamations clearly included submerged
lands when Glacier Bay National Monument was established. Brief for the Plaintiff at 11
n.4, Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. 2137 (2005) (No. 128).
80. Brief for the Defendant at 31-33, Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct.
2137 (2005) (No. 128). See 53 Stat. 2534 (1939); 69 Stat. c27 (1955).
81. Brief for the Defendant, supra note 80, at 31-32.
82. Id. at 33-34.

2006]

Glacier Bay and Alaska v. United States

171

the proviso to section 6(e).83 The United States argued that although the
initial portion of the clause effectively conveyed to Alaska specific federal
property governed by three specific statutes, the proviso that followed the
initial clause expressed Congress’s intent to retain federal title to all federal
reservations withdrawn or otherwise set apart for wildlife conservation,
regardless of the particular statutory authorities under which they had been
established.84 In other words, Congress had been specific in the first section
(conveying areas used for conservation under three specific laws) and more
general in the proviso (explicitly excluding from transfer lands set aside as
wildlife refuge areas).
In contrast, Alaska had argued that the words “such transfer” in the
proviso signaled that the proviso’s federal reservation exception applied
only to a subset of the specific properties covered under the initial clause.
Moreover, Alaska maintained that any ambiguity in the construction of the
clause had to weigh in Alaska’s favor, because this proviso did not suffice
as a definite declaration or otherwise plain expression under the intent test.85
The Court first acknowledged in dicta that congressional intent to
reserve submerged lands in Glacier Bay for the federal government could
have been found by tying together two aspects of the Antiquities Act, the
statute under which the Monument was established.86 Specifically, the Act
expressly stated that the purpose for creating national monuments was to
conserve the scenery and natural objects and wildlife and leave them
unimpaired for future generations,87 while also empowering the President
to “reserve submerged lands.”88
However, the Court based its actual holding on the intent it found in the
proviso to section 6(e). In accordance with the observations of the Special
Master, the Court noted that it was not helpful to generalize about whether
a proviso always qualifies the statement preceding, or whether it can state
a more general, independent rule.89 Statutory construction law recognizes
valid instances of both,90 and the Court ventured that the government’s preferred interpretation of the construction was logical, if atypical.91

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 35; see supra note 38 for text of the initial clause and proviso of section 6(e).
Brief for the Defendant, supra note 80, at 35.
Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 79, at (i).
Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2157.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
Id.
Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2159.
Id. at 2159 (citing McDonald v. United States, 279 U.S. 12, 21 (1929); see 2A
NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:08, at 238 (2000).
91. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2159.
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More importantly, the Court determined that reading the proviso as an
independent statement of intent was consistent with their interpretation of
the same provision in Alaska (Arctic Coast).92 Thus, the Court held that the
proviso of section 6(e) operated as the necessary statement of congressional
intent to retain title to submerged lands in areas set aside as wildlife
reservations by the federal government.93 Accordingly, Glacier Bay’s
submerged lands had been reserved and presumption of state title was
defeated.94
As in Alaska (Arctic Coast), Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas95
dissented on this issue. The dissenters did not consider the proviso, by its
plain text, to rise to the level of a clear expression of intent to retain submerged lands, which the United States has the burden to show under the
intent test.96 The dissenters objected to the majority’s reliance on its interpretation of the proviso in Alaska (Arctic Coast), noting that there the Court
had not actually considered the question of the proviso’s proper construction because they had assumed sua sponte97 that the disputed lands were
covered under the main clause.98
Finally, the dissent observed that as a practical matter, the submerged
lands could be regulated under the federal government’s various powers, so
as to protect the federal government’s purposes regardless of title.99 These
powers include dominant navigational servitude under the SLA (and other
authority),100 Commerce Clause powers,101 and treaty powers.102 In this
92. Id. at 2161.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Justice Scalia authored the partial dissent in the Note case; Justice Thomas authored
the partial dissent in Alaska (Arctic Coast). For simplicity, the dissenting Justices are
described as “dissenters” herein; in both cases, the Justices concurred in other aspects of the
judgments.
96. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2166 (Scalia, J., partially
dissenting).
97. As indicated, the Court had not been briefed on this point, and, notwithstanding the
Court’s assumption, the property in question was not covered under the main clause in fact.
Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2167 (Scalia, J., partially dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2168.
100. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000)).
101. Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) for the proposition
that Congress has the power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce as well as persons or things in interstate commerce).
102. Id. (citing letter from W.C. Henderson, Acting Chief, Bureau of Biological Survey,
Dept. of Agric., to Stephen T. Mather, Dir. Nat’l Park Serv. (Nov. 4, 1926) (on file with
Alaska Exh. AK-405), noting that a colony of ducks in the Monument was protected “at all
times” under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act)).
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regard, the dissent offered two examples of other federal “water parks”
containing state-owned submerged lands, where federal-state cooperation
was the governing regime.103
IV. DISCUSSION
The particular tension that arises when submerged lands are located
within federal reservations originates from the strong presumption of state
title, established under the equal footing doctrine and SLA, and the federal
government’s powers, stemming from the Property Clause of the
Constitution,104 to convey and reserve submerged lands. The Court has
consistently chosen to resolve this tension after consideration of the role
that the submerged lands in question (and the waterways superjacent to
them) play in the purposes and uses of federal reservations. Such
considerations have been at the crux of the Court’s decisions in disputes
over submerged lands within federal reservations.
In applying the two-step intent inquiry to these title disputes, federal
uses and purposes have been the critical factor. In each dispute, the Court
has found federal intent to defeat state title – or lack thereof – by discerning
the past uses and purposes through various statutory sources, in order to
determine whether federal purposes would be harmed by recognition of
state ownership.
In addition to the two Alaska cases discussed above, the Court applied
its test in Utah Division of Lands v. United States,105 Montana v. United
States,106 and Idaho v. United States.107 Utah Division involved the bed of
Utah Lake, officially selected by John Wesley Powell as a potential federal
reservoir site and reserved by congressional enactment.108 The State sought
declaratory judgment after the federal government began to lease oil and

103. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2168 (Scalia, J., partially
dissenting). The parks referenced were the California Coastal National Monument and
Minnesota’s Boundary Waters Canoe Area.
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States . . . .”). The federal government’s constitutional power to convey submerged
lands to third parties in pre-state territories was recognized in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 48 (1893); its power to reserve such lands to itself for appropriate public purposes was
finally solidified in United States v. Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U.S. at 33-34.
105. 482 U.S. 193 (1987).
106. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
107. 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
108. Utah Div. of Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 199 (1987).
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gas rights in the lands underlying the lake in 1976.109 Holding that title had
vested in Utah at statehood, the Court noted that there had been no
congressional discussion about the lake bed itself; indeed, Congress’s
purpose in reserving the lake had been motivated solely by concerns over
increasing settlement of the dry lands surrounding the lake, which presented
a threat to the United States’ reclamation interests.110 The Court further
noted that state title would “not necessarily prevent the Federal Government
from subsequently developing a reservoir or water reclamation project at the
lake in any event” under its powers over navigable waters.111
Similarly, Montana held that title to the bed of a river on the Crow
Reservation had passed to the state at statehood.112 In Montana, federal
treaties creating the reservation did not expressly mention the riverbed and
federal (in this case, the Tribe’s) purposes would not have required
retention of the river bed as the Crow were not a fishing-dependent group
and so were not historic users of the river.113
Where the Court found that federal title was retained, the federal
government’s purposes for establishing reservations and the uses of
submerged lands and their waterways were key factors. In Idaho, a dispute
over submerged lands within the Coeur d’Alene reservation, the Court held
that title to the submerged lands had been successfully prevented from
transfer to the state.114 There the Court was persuaded by the fact that
Congress knew that the reservation would be established for the exclusive
use of the Tribe, and that the Tribe had traditionally used the lake and lake
bed “for everything from water potatoes harvested from the [lake bed] to
fish weirs and traps anchored in riverbeds and banks.”115
Issues of purposes and uses played no less of a role in the Note
decision, as evidenced by preoccupations of the Court at oral argument.
From the beginning of Alaska’s argument, the State’s counsel attempted to
focus the Court’s attention on the test’s second step, the requirement of a
“definite” or “very plain” expression of congressional intent to defeat state
title; but at least one Justice seemed astonished at how Alaska could assert
that the federal government could have created a national monument as

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 208.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 556.
Id.
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 281.
Id. at 265.
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“watery” and inaccessible by land as Glacier Bay without intending to
retain its submerged lands after statehood.116
Moreover, Justices O’Connor and Souter pressed Alaska on the
potential effects of state ownership:
[J. O’Connor]: [A]s a practical matter, tell us what you’re arguing
about. What does Alaska think it can do if it prevails . . . as a
practical matter?
[Alaska]: [T]here are issues relating to local subsistence fishing that
are important to the State. There are issues relating to local uses of
the bay. But more importantly–
[J. Souter]: Well, could—could you be more concrete? I mean,
there–I don’t know what you mean. What are the issues? Can you
give me an explicit example?117
In response to this line of questioning, Alaska offered that the State
would like to allow more subsistence fishing in Glacier Bay.118 But when
pressed further, given that the United States could regulate fishing activities
under other powers, Alaska did not elaborate. Instead, it argued that “what
Alaska seeks here really is a seat at the table. Right now, Alaska has no say
over anything that happens in its navigable waters. . . . What it seeks is to
have its views considered.”119
The United States spent the initial portion of its argument, mostly
engaged by Justice Scalia, contending that section 6(e) of the ASA was a
sufficient statement of intent to defeat state title.120 Justice O’Connor broke
up this exchange to ask, “what do you say are the practical consequences
. . . of disagreeing with the U.S. position? What harm is done? Can the
U.S. protect itself in any event under other clauses?”121 Acknowledging that
it would indeed have the regulatory power over navigable waters to “limit
vessel entries and protect commercial fishing,” the United States answered

116. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, 17-18, Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75
(No. 128) (questions of Justice Breyer).
117. Id. at 14.
118. Historically, the native Tlingit people of Hoonah, Alaska, were engaged in
subsistence fishing in Glacier Bay’s waters. For more about the Tlingits’ fishing practices
and the controversy over restrictions on their traditional fishery, see National Park Service:
Glacier Bay Administrative History, Subsistence Fishing, http://www.nps.gov/glba/adhi/
adhi15.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006); Etta L. Walker, Subsistence Fishing in Glacier Bay
National Park, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 981 (1991).
119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct.
2137 (No. 128).
120. Id. at 27-39.
121. Id. at 39-40.
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that “[o]ur concern is with the actual use of the submerged lands. . . . This
is a laboratory for scientific research.”122 The United States proceeded to
recite a number of seafloor scientific activities and expressed concern that
if title was held by the State, “Alaska would have a realistic argument that
we cannot withdraw materials from the submerged land that we use and
study.”123 On rebuttal, Alaska dismissed this as a “sky is falling argument”
and attempted to reassure the Court that shared management regimes were
both workable and commonplace.124
The Court may have been influenced by an amicus brief submitted by
the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) in support of the
United States, which was referenced in the opinion and dissent.125 The
NPCA argued even more emphatically than the United States had that
Alaska’s planned uses for the Bay were incompatible with federal
purposes.126 The brief first carefully sketched the overlay of protective
federal laws currently controlling minimal-impact activities in Glacier Bay,
and then contrasted these with the state’s proposed approach as described
through a litany of actions and statements of its legislature and governors.127
Moreover, the NPCA looked beyond the state’s well-known, stated
purposes of increased fishing and cruise boat traffic and raised the
possibility that Alaska was also interested in aquaculture and even drilling
(thus raising the specter of the ANWR controversy).128 The NPCA further
emphasized the particular difficulties that could arise under federal-state
adjacent management, given that the federal government could keep its
hand in managing this area under its constitutional powers if title was held
by the State.129 It argued that such shared management would result in
confusion, questions of respective authority that could lead to costly
litigation, and an effective division of one ecosystem.130

122. Id. at 40.
123. Id. at 40-41. Returning to the issue of federal intent to retain title, Justice Souter
asked whether the United States had been engaged in such scientific studies at the time of
statehood, which could show that Congress had notice of the importance of the submerged
lands to the Monument. The United States confirmed that geological study was going on
there at that time. Id. at 43-44.
124. Id. at 57-58.
125. See Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S. Ct. at 2157; see also id. at 2168
(Scalia, J., partially dissenting).
126. Brief of Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n as Amicus Curiae supporting Defendant,
Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 5, 125 S. Ct. 2137 (2005) (No. 22-30).
127. Id. at 25-29.
128. Id. at 27-28.
129. Id. at 29-30.
130. Id.
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The Court’s ruling in Alaska was hailed as a victory by conservationists, who prefer the National Park Service’s brand of stewardship to the
increase in vessels and other activities that Alaska would have sanctioned.131
Divorced from the Glacier Bay context, however, the case is not likely to
signal any sort of new approach in federal reserves. Despite the result in
Alaska, it would be simplistic and unsupportable to suggest that the Court
has shown any general preference for recognizing title to submerged lands
within federal areas in the federal government (and the tribes). Two of the
disputes discussed above were resolved with state title and three with
federal. The two cases specifically involving submerged lands on Indian
reservations split evenly. And it is noteworthy that although the two Alaska
cases both recognized federal title, the federal purposes were quite varied:
classically exploitative in Alaska (Arctic Coast)’s Petroleum Reserve and
classically preservationist in ANWR and Glacier Bay. In short, the Court
has shown no general preference for a particular purpose or purposes, as
some might wish.
Indeed, though it may be appropriate for those interested in stemming
vessel traffic in Glacier Bay to breathe a sigh of relief after the Alaska
decision, it is conceivable that, in another context, conservationists could
find themselves in support of state ownership of submerged lands. For
example, title to submerged lands could provide a basis for managing uses
in federal reserves where the federally managed activity involves mineral
extraction leasing, fishing of depleted stocks, or other exploitative uses. In
such a scenario, it would be the conservationists’ turn to convince a court
whether state title can really matter when the federal government can draw
on its numerous powers to control uses of navigable waterways. Indeed,
given such formidable authority as the Commerce Clause, Alaska’s efforts
in challenging the United States on issues of vessel navigation and
commercial fishing in navigable waters seem alternately heroic and
foolhardy. Clearly, the backdrop of such federal authority is an ominous
presence for any party hoping to convince a court that it too should have “a
seat at the table.” Could it be done? The threshold matter would be
whether the state can plausibly make that initial claim of title by surmounting the Court’s test of federal intent.
What the cases employing the intent test demonstrate is that despite the
Court’s emphasis on finding and carrying out congressional intent—which
it has repeatedly stated it will “not infer”—quieting title to submerged lands

131. See Matt Volz, Associated Press, High Court Rebuffs Alaska on Glacier Bay
Ownership; Conservationists Relieved, SEATTLE TIMES, June 7, 2005, at B4, available at
2005 WLNR 9046546 (noting the National Parks Conservation Association’s relief with the
Court’s holding).
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within federal reservations is an exercise in dusting off statutes and
executive statements that may only tangentially contemplate submerged
lands. And because these express statements and statutes generally do not
address submerged lands thoroughly, consideration of the purposes and uses
of the reservations has been the Court’s most reliable proxy for obscure
congressional intent.
This consideration does require an inference, however, which vexed the
partial dissenters in Alaska. The section 6(e) proviso does seem to fall short
of overcoming the tough presumption of state title set by the equal footing
doctrine and codified in the SLA. Notwithstanding legitimate judicial
debates over the proper scope and effect of provisos under the laws of
statutory construction,132 it may seem unsatisfactory that a proviso of
arguable interpretation could suffice as “definitely declared or otherwise
made very plain” federal intent. But whatever relationship to the main
clause the proviso was meant to have, it does in any event show that, at the
time of Alaska statehood, Congress was thinking about retaining areas of
the territory that it maintained for established public purposes.
In effect, then, do rulings like Alaska soften the SLA’s mandate to
surmount a “very strong” presumption of state ownership of submerged
lands? In these particularized disputes over submerged lands within the
boundaries of federal reservations, yes. Alaska shows that the Court tends
to look to the historic and existing purposes of the existing federal reservation, conscious of whether those purposes and uses would be consistent
with potential and intended uses arising from state ownership.
This is a prudent analysis, though inconsistent with the federal government’s high burden as set under the equal footing doctrine and the SLA
(and the Court’s own interpretation of both). But considering the potential
pitfalls of shared management within federal areas, and the realistic fact that
neither the state nor the federal agencies have coffers to support activitymonitoring and conflicts with one another, it is not surprising that the Court
is amenable to resolving these questions of title in favor of unitary
governance. Therefore, unless a state can clearly show that its management
style and planned uses are aligned with federal purposes—or at least not
inconsistent with them—it is likely that title to submerged areas in national
reserves will be found to vest with the United States. Alaska, unable to
articulate a future course sufficiently respectful of the historic federal

132. Alaska v. United States has already been cited for the Court’s recognition that a
proviso does not always qualify the main clause but may sometimes set forth a proposition
independent from the clause to which it is attached. See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. Civ.A.05CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005).
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approach, did not meet this unstated burden in its failed bid to control
Glacier Bay.

